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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
------------------~-------------~--------

CITY OF SOUTH OGDEN, A UTAH
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

EMMA K. FUJIKI,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16902

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the final order and judgment of the
Second District Court, Weber County, Honorable John F. Washlquist
presiding, arising out of a condemnation action.

The judgment had

been stipulated with the matter of interest on the award reserved for
determination on appeal.

The City at first sought sUtlllilary disposition

under Rule 73 but this was denied.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellant City seeks a reversal of the interest portion of
the award as contained in the judgment.

STATEl1ENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff City connnenced this eminent domain proceeding
seeking to condemn the unimproved real property belonging to defendant
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for the purpose of construction of a new municipal building.

Several

adjoining tracts, all unimproved, were filed against at the same time
Appeals in those cases: (Case No. 16903 and Case No. 16904) are here
the same time.

al

They were consolidated for trial below.

Plaintiff in its complaint prayed for an order of occupancy
but never did formally move the Court for an order, nor did it ever
ente~

or take actual possession nor connnence any construction.
Defendant or defendants in answering admitted all the

material allegations of the complaint but denied that just compensation had been offered (though there was no allegation in the complaint'
that any off er had ever been made) .

The prayer in the answer request

an award of just compensation together with interest from the date of
acceptance of service of sunnnons.
The matter of just compensation for the taking was subsequently agreed upon and a stipulation entered into.

This reserved

for appealthematter of determination of the date from which the
interest should corrn:nence to run.

Judgment was entered for the amount

agreed upon together with interest from the date of acceptance of
service.

The principal amount has been paid.

A final order of con-

demnation awaits the determination of the interest question pursuant
to the stipulation.

A fourth contiguous piece of property which had

a house on it was also involved.

This was the subject of a separate

settlement however, and it is not involved in this appeal.
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
INTEREST ON A CONDEMNATION AWARD RUNS FROM THE DATE
OF ACTUAL POSSESSION OR ORDER OF OCCUPANCY, WHICHEVER IS EARLIER.
The judgment was drawn pursuant to the lower Court's pretrial order which found that the allegations of the City's complaint
having been admitted and the City praying for occupancy even though
no hearing was held nor any order entered, nor any possession actually
taken, the value of the property was substantially destroyed since
possession could have been taken anytime.

Interest was therefore

allowed from the date of acceptance of service of summons.

In effect

the position of the defendants and that of the lower Court is that by
admitting the allegations in the complaint the defendants have, in
effect, abandoned the property to the City.
The statute, 78-34-9 UCA 1953 as amended, is quite lengthly
but provides in essence that the plaintiff may move the Court for an
order of occupancy after connnencement of the action the same to be
granted or refused according to the equity of the case.

If granted,

the condemnor must post an amount equal to 75% of its appraised
value of the premises.

The right to just compensation shall then vest

and be thereafter determined.

The particular language as to interest

is as follows:
"
.The rights of just compensation for the land
so taken or damaged shall vest in the parties entitled
thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained
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and awarded as provided in section 78-34-10 and
established by judgment therein, and the said
judgment shall include, as part of the just
compensation awarded, interest at the rate or
8% per annum on the amount finally awarded as
the value of the property and damages, from
the date of taking actual possession thereof
by,the plaintiff or order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date of judgment; . . . . "
The granting of an order is discretionary with the Court and is
granted consistent with the equities in the case, or is accordingly
refused.

Utah Copper v. Montana Bingham Consol. Min. Co. 69 U.423,

255 P. 672; State v. Denver & Rio Grande 8 U2d 236, 332 P.2d 926.
Under the theory of respondent, it would not make any difference if
the Court, upon application, were to refuse to grant the order if the
other facts were present as in the instant case, i.e. , the defendant'
admission of the plaintiff's allegations coupled with the prayer for
an order.

In other words, if the City prays for an order and the

defendant admits all allegations then the City has constructively
possessed and is liable for interest from the date of service of
sunnnons whether the Court is formally moved for an order or not.

No

judicial pronouncement of this assertion has been found.
This Court has uniformly held, pursuant to the statute, tha
interest runs from the date of actual possession or order of occupanc
whichever is earlier.

Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Jones, 29 u. 147,

80 P. 732; State v. Peek, 1 U2d 263, 265 P 2d 630; State v.
Inc., 17 U2d 135, 405 P.2d 420.

Bettilyo~

These cases are illustrative of the
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though there are many others which follow the rule.

See also the

excellent discussion in Independent School Dist. v. C. B. Lauch
Const. Co. 305 P.2d 1077 (Idaho) which cites the Utah cases and
comments on various annotations discussing the rule.

The Idaho

statute is similar to that of Utah and the Idaho Court accordingly
acknowledged no interest to be allowable prior to entry.

This Court

said in Peek at P. 269:
"Appellants have cited no case and we have found
none which holds that where under the state law
the taking occurs when the possession of the
property is actually surrendered, and not when
the suit was commenced, that the failure to
allow interest from the time of the commencement
of the action constitutes a violation of these
constitutional provisions, but a number of
courts, including the Supreme Court of the
United States, have held to the contrary
'(citing authority)'. So we will adhere to
our previous rule that interest is recoverable
only from the time of taking possession of the
property."
And again at Pages 267 and 268:
"Appellants are not entitled to interest on the
judgment prior to the time when actual possession
was taken. This Court has uniformly so held
(citing cases)."
The same quote came from Bettilyon at pages 137 and 138:
"Interest accrues only from the time of actual
taking of possession by occupation or entry or
upon final judgment and order of condemnation
(citing cases)."
Would anyone advising a condemning authority under our

state of facts

feel comfortable in telling it to go upon the ground without an agreement allowing entry or a formal order of the Court so authorizing.

At this time the owner still retains the fee interest until it is
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divested by judicial proceeding.

Any physical entry outside the pro.

tection of either would be tortious.
We call attention again to Jones v. Oregon Short Line,
supra.

There the appellants argued that there was in ef feet a takin

at the time of service of sunnnons so compensation became due then
and interest should be allowed from then until verdict.

This Court

held that in determining the interest claim it must be determined
when there was a taking since the condemner is not required to make
compensation until the taking either actual or constructive.
mat.erial point therefore is when did the taking occur.

The

Trial and

verdict determining liability were held to constitute the taking not
the service of sununons.

It was observed that Sec. 3599 R. S. Utah

rn

(now 78-34-11) fixes the time with reference to which compensation is
to be computed rather than fixing the time of taking.

There was in

Jones no physical entry nor occupation nor was any requested.

Intere

was held allowable therefore as of the time of taking.
In the case at bar we submit there was no taking until the
judgment.

We, therefore, allow interest from the date of taking

actual possession or entry of the order of occupancy under 78-34-9
or pursuant to the provisions of 78-34-13 after the lapse of 30 days
after judgment.

If respondent's position is correct then the propert

must necessarily be deemed to have been taken at the time of acceptan
of service of sunnnons.

This does not accord with the decisions of

this Court.

- 6 -
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We have found no case which, under the facts of the one at
bar, would say that a plaintiff has actually possessed the property
involved.

Actual according to its connnon meaning means existing in

fact or reality and not false or apparent.
CONCLUSION
The lower Court erred in allowing the computation of
interest from the date of acceptance of service of summons, actual
possession not being taken nor any order of occupancy asked for nor
granted.
Respe~tfully submi_i::~~
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RICHARD L. STINE
Attorney for
Plaintiff-Appellant
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